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Probative Value and the Unreasonable
Search: A Constitutional
Perspective on Workplace Drug Testing
Allan Adlert
Although it has been a topic of considerable discussion within
the scientific and medical communities, the probative value of the
results of urinalysis drug testing has received scant judicial consideration. On the whole, courts have not regarded probative value as
a significant factor in determining whether an employer's legitimate interest in a "drug-free workplace" justifies mandatory testing of employees to identify the users of illegal drugs.
Even where employment testing has been mandated by the
government, and courts have consequently determined whether the
tests constitute "unreasonable searches" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the relationship between the evidentiary capacity of urinalysis drug tests and the government's workplace objective in requiring them has been seldom considered relevant and
rarely determinative. 1
To some extent, the courts' failure to focus on the significance
t Legislative Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union and Center for National
Securities Studies. The views expressed in this article are Mr. Adler's and are not intended
to reflect the views of the ACLU.
See, for example, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir. 1986); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d
1264 (7th Cir. 1976); American Federationof Governmental Employees v. Weinberger, 651
F. Supp 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510
(D. Neb. 1987), aft'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988); Louvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn.,
647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), afl'd 846 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482
(N.D. Ga. 1985); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Mullholland v. Department of the Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565 (E.D. Va. 1987); Caruso v. Ward,
133 Misc.2d 544, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1986), aff'd 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1987);
King v. McMickens, 120 A.D.2d 351, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1986), aff'd as Perez v. Ward, 69
N.Y.2d 840, 514 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1987); Turner v. FraternalOrder of Police, 500 A.2d 1005
(D.C. App. 1985); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461, 524
A.2d 430 (1987). But see McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 2033
(1988); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Federation of Federal
Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp.
1422 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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of this issue in government-mandated drug testing cases may be
attributed to the relentless debate, among litigants and judges
alike, over the question which many view as determinative in the
application of traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine; that is,
whether probable cause, in the form of "individualized reasonable
suspicion" of drug use, is a prerequisite of a "reasonable" testing
requirement. With only one little-noticed exception,2 court decisions under the Fourth Amendment invariably turn upon the
court's resolution of this question as a predicate to balancing the
government's interest in requiring the tests against the intrusion
into protected privacy interests that results from conducting
them.'
Despite its current prevalence, this approach to determining
the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" of such workplace testing is flawed in a pragmatical sense. An understanding of these
flaws should lead the courts to base their determinations, at least
in significant part, on an assessment of the probative value of
urinalysis drug testing.
One problem with the prevailing approach is that it unrealistically fails to acknowledge that the Supreme Court, in its most recent decisions relative to the "search" issues raised by workplace
drug testing," has perfunctorily bypassed the "probable cause"
question. Instead, the Court has proceeded directly to a "balancing" analysis in which the "reasonableness" of the search may be
foreordained by the Court's generous characterization and solicitous view of the government's interest in requiring it.' Because the
searches at issue in both New Jersey v. T.L.O. and O'Connor v.
Ortega were based upon individualized suspicion of wrong-doing,
the Court did not decide "whether individualized suspicion is an
essential element of the standard of reasonableness. 6 However,
the general thrust of these decisions and the Court's explicit language in other contexts make clear that "the Fourth Amendment

See Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 39-41 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
3 For a summary of the jurisprudence on "individualized suspicion," see Feliciano v.

City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. at 590 (cited in note 1) ("the overwhelming majority of
cases challenging urinalysis has concluded with decisions either that testing is unconstitutional in the absence of individualized suspicion, or that testing was proper because individualized suspicion was present" (emphasis added)).
' New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) and O'Connor v. Ortega, 94 L. Ed.2d 714
(1987).
' See generally O'Connor, 94 L. Ed.2d at 741 (Blackmun, with Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, dissenting).
6 O'Connor, 94 L. Ed.2d at 729; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n. 8.

PROBATIVE VALUE
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."'
Equally troubling is the fact that, since the Third Circuit's decision in Shoemaker v. Handel,' there has been a tendency among
testing proponents, as well as a temptation within the judiciary, to
measure the weight of the asserted government interest in other
drug testing cases by comparison to the asserted government interest which prevailed over individual privacy interests in Shoemaker.9 Although relatively few courts have been persuaded to follow Shoemaker's Fourth Amendment analysis,' 0 the deferential
findings in Shoemaker regarding the state's interest in "assuring
the public of the integrity of the persons engaged in the horse racing industry" have established an extremely low comparative
threshold for government justification of testing requirements in
other areas of employment. Under the current "balancing" approach, there is a real risk that the interest in requiring testing for
employees in safety or security-related fields may be deemed
7 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n. 8, quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543,
560-61 (1976). See also Delawarev. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979) ("In those situations
in which the balance of interests precludes insistence upon 'some quantum of individualized
suspicion,' other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field,'" citing
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
' 795 F.2d 1136 (cited in note 1) (upheld random urinalysis drug testing of jockeys
pursuant to New Jersey Racing Commission regulations).
' See, for example, McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308 (cited in note 1) (testing of certain
prison employees without individualized suspicion was justified on the grounds that "the
state's interest in safeguarding the security of its correctional institutions is at least as
strong as its interest in safeguarding the integrity of, and the public confidence in, the horse
racing industry"); Rushton, 653 F.Supp. at 1525 (cited in note 1) (relied on Shoemaker and
McDonell in finding comparable state "strong interest in maintaining public confidence" in
nuclear plant safety and security); National Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists v. Dole, No.
A87-073, slip op. at 34 (D. Alaska March 27, 1987) ("The rationale of the Third Circuit
upholding drug urinalysis for jockeys in order to protect the integrity of horse racing is even
more compelling when the public need for air safety is considered"). But see Capua, 643 F.
Supp. at 1520 (cited in note 1) (firefighters); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v.
Board of Education, 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 517
N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987) (public school teachers).
"oThe court in Shoemaker held that the "administrative search exception" to the warrant and "probable cause" requirements of the Fourth Amendment applied to employees
voluntarily participating in the "heavily-regulated" horse racing industry. 795 F.2d at 1142.
While it is not within the scope of this article to evaluate the propriety of this holding, it is
relevant to note simply that numerous other courts have either distinguished Shoemaker on
its facts or found its reasoning inapplicable. See, for example, Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 2033 (1988); Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 591 (cited in note 1); American Federation of Government Employees
v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 734 (cited in note 1); Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1522 (cited in
note 1); Fraternal Order of Police, 524 A.2d at 434-35 (cited in note 1); Caruso, 506
N.Y.S.2d at 798 (cited in note 1). But see Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1525 (cited in note 1);
McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308 (cited in note 1).
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"compelling," while the interest in testing in other occupations
may at least be deemed "substantial," by conclusory comparison to
the one at issue in Shoemaker.
Assessing the "probative value" of urinalysis drug testing in
relation to the government's objective in requiring such testing is a
more sensible measure of its "reasonableness" under the Fourth
Amendment because it avoids these pitfalls in the prevailing approach.1 1 After all, if a particular method of search is inherently
incapable of producing the type of evidence which will serve the
objective that justifies its initiation, then utilizing that method of
search in pursuit of that objective must be "unreasonable," regardless of whether the search is or is not conditioned upon a requirement of "reasonable suspicion."
Moreover, as this reasoning implies, the probative value of the
search method derives its significance from its relationship to the
stated objective in initiating the search. Thus, a by-product of an
analysis of the probative value of urinalysis drug testing is a more
rigorous examination of the asserted government interest that justifies requiring the tests. This, in turn, would require the asserted
government interest to be articulated with a more exacting specificity than has been necessary under the current "balancing" approach-a development which could, in the case of the often-invoked but seldom examined employer's interest in a "drug-free
workplace," raise questions about the "reasonableness" of the end
as well as the means used to attain it.
In anticipation of the Supreme Court's rulings on governmentmandated workplace drug testing,1 2 Part I of this article demonstrates that the probative value of a particular method of search
has been an important albeit implicit and understated part of the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" analysis.
, Since even a truly probative method of search may be "unreasonable" in the circumstances in which it is utilized, the author does not contend that the probative value of a
particular search method should become the sole and exclusive measure of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness." In the context of urinalysis workplace drug testing, however, this
issue may be dispositive, rather than merely relevant, depending upon the specific government interest which is asserted to justify the search requirement.
" On February 29, 1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (cited in note 1), a case in which the Court of
Appeals upheld testing without a requirement of reasonable individualized suspicion for
U.S. Customs Service employees seeking transfer into certain "sensitive positions." Then, on
June 6, 1988, the Court granted certiorari in Burnley v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,
839 F.2d 575 (cited in note 1), wherein a Federal Railroad Administration regulation requiring post-accident testing was struck down because testing was not predicated on individualized suspicion. 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
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Part II of the article argues that the limited probative value of a
"positive" urinalysis drug test, in relation to the employer's legitimate interest in "work-related" drug abuse, significantly undercuts
the government's justification for such tests. It will conclude on
these grounds that such tests, even when predicated on reasonable
suspicion, generally constitute "unreasonable searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
I.

CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AND PROBATIVE

VALUE

A. Probative Value and Schmerber
Many courts that have found government-mandated urinalysis
drug testing in the workplace to constitute a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment have reached this conclusion
in reliance upon the Supreme Court's holding in Schmerber v. California's regarding involuntary blood-alcohol testing.' 4 Virtually all
of these decisions, however, have unaccountably failed to recognize
the significance which the Schmerber Court attached to the probative value of such testing in assessing its "reasonableness" under
the circumstances that brought it about.
In analyzing the reasonableness of the blood test in Schmerber,'5 the Court posed a two-step inquiry. It asked first "whether
the police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the
blood test," and then "whether the means and procedures em-

" 384 U.S. 757 (1966). For cases relying expressly on Schmerber, see, for example, McDonelU, 809 F.2d at 1307 (cited in note 1); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,647 F. Supp. 875,
879 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), afl'd 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 488 (cited
in note 1).
14 See Feliciano, 661 F.Supp. at 584-85 (cited in note 1) and Note, A Proposal for
Mandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civilian Employees, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 322, 332-33
(1987), both distinguishing cases that have relied on Schmerber from cases which reached
the same Fourth Amendment conclusion based upon independent analysis, assumption
without discussion, or the agreement of the parties. For the purposes of this article, it is
assumed that the Supreme Court will similarly conclude that workplace urinalysis drug testing constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search."
" The Fourth Amendment claim at issue in Schmerber was asserted by an individual
whose conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor had been based,
in part, on the chemical analysis of a blood sample which had been taken, over his objections on the advice of counsel, by a physician acting at the direction of the arresting police
officer.
The Court wasted few words in finding that "[s]uch testing procedures plainly constitute searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures of 'persons,' within the
meaning of the [Fourth Amendment]." 384 U.S. at 767 (cited in note 13).
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ployed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment
standards of reasonableness.'"
Although the Court found that the elements of probable cause
and exigency were sufficiently demonstrated to meet traditional
Fourth Amendment standards under the first part of its analysis, 7
the Court refused to find that the police were justified in requiring
the petitioner to submit to the blood test until it first concluded
that "the test chosen to measure petitioner's blood-alcohol level
was a reasonable one.""
Citing its earlier ruling in Breithaupt v. Abram, 9 the Court
concluded that this type of evidentiary search was reasonable because "[e]xtraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effective
means of determining the degree to which a person is under the
' 20
influence of alcohol.
The Court's due process examination in Breithaupt went to
the reasons why the blood test procedure "has become routine in
our everyday life '2 1 and why the blood-alcohol test was a valid and
acceptable one to employ in the circumstances in which it was
used. "The test upheld here is not attacked on the ground of any
basic deficiency or of injudicious application," the Court concluded, "but admittedly is a scientifically accurate method of detecting alcoholic content in the blood, thus furnishing an exact
measure upon which to base a decision as to intoxication."22
Schmerber was the first Supreme Court decision to examine a

10

Id. at 768.

17

Id. at 770-71.

"

Id. at 771.

352 U.S. 432 (1957). Breithaupt had not involved a Fourth Amendment issue, but,
instead, confronted the Court with a "due process" challenge to a blood-alcohol test which
provided evidence of intoxication to help convict a truck driver of involuntary manslaughter
in connection with a highway accident. A Fourth Amendment claim, similar to the one considered by the Court in Schmerber, was rejected in Breithaupt because the Court had not
yet held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 434. After Breithaupt and prior to Schmerber, the
Court extended the reach of the Fourth Amendment to state officers in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
20 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (cited in note 13).
21 352 U.S. at 436. The blood sample used for the test had been taken by an attending
physician in a hospital emergency room at the request of a state patrolman while the truck
driver was unconscious. The driver argued that seeking to collect evidence in this manner
was analogous to the forcible use of a stomach pump which had "shocked the conscience" of
the Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The Court in Breithaupt distinguished the facts in Rochin and refused to apply the "due process" rationale from that case
on the grounds that "there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a sample of
blood when done, as in this case, under the protective eye of a physician." 352 U.S. at 435.
"

"' Id. at 439.
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Fourth Amendment search of one's "person" involving governmental intrusion into the bodily integrity of the individual. More than
twenty years later, Schmerber remains the touchstone for Fourth
Amendment analysis of searches that violate bodily integrity, and
its appreciation of the significance of the probative value of the
evidence which may be obtained by the particular type of search at
issue is reflected clearly, if not explicitly, in its progeny.
In Winston v. Lee,2 3 for example, the Court, without dissent,
held that requiring a robbery suspect to undergo surgery under a
local anesthetic, in order to remove a bullet which might identify
him as the perpetrator of the crime, would constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment analysis derived from
Schmerber.4
Justice Brennan, the author of the opinions in both Schmerber and Lee, distinguished the reasonableness of the search at issue in the former case from that of the one before the Court in
Lee. The distinctions were primarily based upon the degree of intrusiveness and the need for the evidence that could be obtained in
each case. Brennan noted that in Lee, as in Schmerber, the Court
was required to weigh the intrusion of the search upon the individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity against "the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or
'25
innocence.
The Court in Lee noted that the far greater degree of intrusiveness associated with the surgical search sought in that case
could not be justified by the claimed need of the bullet to identify
its bearer as the perpetrator of the robbery in question, since authorities already possessed substantial evidence of the origin of the
bullet through the identification of the suspect by the robbery victim who had fired at his assailant.26
Brennan explained that the blood test in Schmerber directly
served the "community's interest" which justified its initiation because it is "a highly effective means of determining the degree to
which a person is under the influence of alcohol. ' '27 He emphasized,
among other things, that the authorities in Schmerber "clearly had
probable cause to believe that [the petitioner] had been driving
while intoxicated, and to believe that a blood test would provide

23 470 U.S. 753, 767-68 (1985).
" Id. at 755.
25 Id. at 762.
26 Id. at 765-66.
"

Id. at 762-63.
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evidence that was exceptionally probative in confirming this

belief.

' 28

Significantly, the Court also noted the existence of "questions
concerning the probative value of the bullet, even if it could be
' The Court recognized
retrieved."29
that the "evidentiary value of
the bullet" was dependent upon ballistics tests which might be
hampered by a number of factors, including corrosion of the bullet's markings in the time it had been in the suspect's shoulder and
the fact that "any given gun may be incapable of firing bullets that
have a consistent set of markings."3 Such problems, the Court recognized, could make it impossible to compare the markings, if any,
on the bullet in the suspect's shoulder and the markings, if any,
found on a test bullet that police could fire from the victim's gun.
Ultimately, the fact that "the courts below made no findings
on this point" led the Court to "hesitate to give it significant
weight in our analysis."'" Nevertheless, the Court's observations
reinforce the conclusion that the probative value of the evidence
obtained through a particular method of search is a salient factor
in evaluating Fourth Amendment "reasonableness."
B.

Probative Value and the "Dual Inquiry" Standard in Terry

Two years after the Supreme Court decided Schmerber v. California, its landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio32 established a twopronged inquiry for determining Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" in circumstances where "the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security" stops short of a "full-blown
search." 3 Although Terry involved a specific question regarding
police investigative conduct, the standards set forth in that decision have now become the Court's analytical guideposts for determining the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" of government
"searches" in noncriminal cases.3 4 In so doing, they provide the ba28

Id. at 759 (emphasis added).

Id. at 766 n. 10.
30 Id.
31 Id.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 19. In Terry, the Court considered what it characterized as the "quite narrow
question" of "whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest." Id. at
15. As a predicate for this inquiry, the Court first concluded that Police Officer McFadden's
"stop-and-frisk" confrontation with petitioner Terry, which resulted in the officer's discovery of a gun and Terry's arrest on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon, constituted a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 19.
", See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (cited in note 4); O'Connor, 94 L. Ed.2d at 728-29
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ses for concluding that the "probative value" analysis is at least an
implicit part of the Court's most recent decisions of relevance to
its upcoming review of government-mandated drug testing in the
35
workplace.
In proceeding to determine whether the seizure and search of
petitioner were "unreasonable," the Court in Terry stated that
"our inquiry is a dual one-whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.""
In addressing the first prong of the inquiry, the Court began
by examining the governmental interest "'which allegedly justifies
official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen.' ",37 To justify the search, the Court focused on
the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed
with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him.""8 The Court concluded that on the facts and circumstances
detailed at trial "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing petitioner was armed and thus presented a
threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." 39

(cited in note 4). In between the Schmerber and Terry decisions, the Court, in Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967), extended the Fourth Amendment to noncriminal
searches, noting that "[lit is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."
See O'Connor, 94 L. Ed.2d at 728-29; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
3 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 (cited in note 32). The Court, in preparing to rely on "reasonableness" as the measure of Fourth Amendment constitutionality, denied any "retreat"
from prior holdings that "police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure," and distinguished the case
before it as dealing with "an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has
not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure." Id. at
20.
17 Id. at 20-21, quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35, 536-37. Although the Court
noted a
general governmental interest in "effective crime prevention and detection ... which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest," it reasoned that this general
interest went only to "the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior," and not to whether there was "justification for McFadden's
invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that
investigation." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23.
38

Id.

11 Id. at 28. The Court reviewed at length the "suspicious behavior" of petitioner and
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Finding a legitimate government interest to justify the search
satisfied the first prong of the Court's inquiry, that is, whether the
search was "justified in its inception;" however, the second prong,
concerning the "scope" of the search, remained at issue, since "a
search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope." 0°
"The Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by limitations upon
the scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions
upon its initiation,""' and for this reason, "reasonableness" also requires that "[t]he scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible.""
Based on its view of the justification for the search at issue in
Terry, the Court concluded that the search itself "must be limited
to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." 3 More specifically, the search must be "confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer.""
Unlike the blood-alcohol content test in Schmerber v. California or the surgical and ballistics techniques discussed in Winston
v. Lee, the search methodology at issue in Terry did not consist of
standardized procedures developed through empirical testing of
scientific principles and technological capabilities which permitted
their probative value in relation to specific justifying interests to
be objectively ascertained prior to initiation. The scope of Officer
McFadden's "frisk" was not restricted by any inherent limitation
in the probative capability of the available technique, but by the
principle of "reasonableness" which required that it be narrowly

his companions, and concluded that it was "consistent with [Officer] McFadden's hypothesis
that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery-which, it is reasonable to assume,
would be likely to involve the use of weapons." Id.
40 Id. at 18 (cites omitted).
" Id. at 28-29.
4" Id. at 19 (cites omitted).
" Id. at 26.
" Id. at 29. The Court's review of the record indicated that Officer McFadden patted
down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions, but did not place his hands
in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he felt weapons. The
Court thus found that "Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally
necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the
weapons." Id. at 30. It emphasized that he "did not conduct a general exploratory search for
whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find," but instead "carefully restricted his
search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought."
Id.

PROBATIVE VALUE
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gauged to what was "necessary" to produce evidence that would be
probative of the protective interests which justified the intrusion in
the first place. Still, the concerns of the Court in all three cases
were closely related, and it seems clear from the Court's statements that limiting a search to that which is capable of producing
probative evidence is as much a part of the "scope" element in
Terry's "reasonableness" standard as is limiting the search to what
is necessary for that purpose.
The relevance of this conclusion for government-mandated
urinalysis drug testing in the workplace stems from the fact that,
as indicated earlier, the Terry Court's "dual inquiry" standard has
become the analytical framework for determining the "reasonableness" of a Fourth Amendment search in noncriminal contexts.
C.

T.L.O. and O'Connor:'ExtendingTerry and Probative Value
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,4 5 the Court engaged in the "dual in-

quiry" analysis as a means of implementing its ruling that the legality of a search of a student by school officials "should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search.""" The Court explained:
Under ordinary circumstances a search of a student by a
teacher or other school official will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
student has violated or is violating either the law or the
rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in
its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and
the nature of the infraction. 7
Five members of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice
469 U.S. 325 (cited in note 4).
Id. at 341. T.L.O. arose from a school official's demand to see a student's purse after
the student, accused of violating school rules by smoking in the lavatory, claimed that she
never used cigarettes at all. Upon opening T.L.O.'s purse and seeing a pack of cigarettes, the
official removed the pack to confront her with it. In the process, he noticed a pack of cigarette rolling papers, which led him to suspect that T.L.O. was using marijuana. Proceeding
with a full search of the purse he found a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, and a number
of other items, including two letters, which he read in the belief that they implicated T.L.O.
in drug trafficking. The official turned the evidence of suspected drug dealing over to the
police precipitating actions which eventually lead to T.L.O. being sentenced to one year's
probation in juvenile court on a charge of delinquency.
" Id. at 341-42.
45
41
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White, concluded that the school official's actions had been "in no
sense unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes."48 In what
could have been the basis for a holding in the opposite direction,
the majority conceded that the discovery of the cigarettes in her
purse "would not prove that T.L.O. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent
with her claim that she did not smoke at all."'4 9 But then, measuring the value of this disclosure under the standards of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the majority concluded that "[t]he relevance of
T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question whether she had
been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked
supplied the necessary 'nexus' between the item searched for and
the infraction under investigation. 6 0
The majority's reference to the Federal Rules makes clear that
its discussion of "relevance" is, in fact, an analysis of "probative
value." 51 The standard for probative value, as established by Rule
401, is a broad one insofar as "it is universally recognized that evidence to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the
ultimate fact in issue, but only have 'any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.'" The same thing, however, can be said for the majority's conclusion that the accusation of smoking in the lavatory
justified the search by establishing reason to suspect that T.L.O.
had cigarettes in her purse.2
The majority noted that "T.L.O. had been accused of smoking,
and had denied the accusation in the strongest possible terms
,0 Id. at 343.
19 Id. at 345.
80 Id. Upon finding the initial portion of the search to be reasonable, the majority proceeded to find that the extended search for evidence of drug use, which followed from the
removal of the cigarettes and the disclosure of the rolling paper, was also reasonable. Id. at
347. The majority dismissed, as "hairsplitting argumentation," T.L.O.'s contention that the
school official was not justified in removing the cigarettes from the purse, even if he was
justified in opening the purse to see if they were there. Id. at 346 n. 12. In equally conclusory fashion, the majority determined that the discovery of the rolling papers gave rise to
a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marijuana which, in turn, justified "further
exploration" of T.L.O.'s purse, including the extension to a separate zippered compartment
from which T.L.O.'s letters and index card were taken and examined. Id. at 347.
" "Problems of relevancy call for an answer to the question whether an item of evidence, when tested by the processes of legal reasoning, possesses sufficient probative value
to justify receiving it in evidence." Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, Fed.
Rule Evid. 401.
5' T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 345 (cited in note 4).
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when she stated that she did not smoke at all." 58 Under those circumstance, it concluded, "T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes, once it
was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she had
been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to the
charge of smoking. ' 4
In concluding that the evidence discovered by the school official's search had "probative value" to qualify as "relevant" evidence under the Federal Rules standard, the majority in T.L.O.
must have concluded, if only by implication, that the actual search
conducted, that is, opening and visually inspecting the contents of
T.L.O.'s purse, had the requisite "probative value" to be considered a reasonable method of search within the meaning of both the
"inception" and "scope" prongs of the Terry "dual inquiry" into
Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
In the end, however, the majority's discussion of "relevance"
shed more light on the "probative value" of the evidence that is
obtained than on the "probative value" of the search method used
to obtain it; whatever the relationship between the two concepts of
"probative value" might be, the majority in T.L.O. offered nothing
to elucidate it.5 5 Similarly, while it extended the "dual inquiry"
standard of Terry, the majority failed to grasp the significance of
that standard in terms of the "probative value" rationale it
embodies. 6
If the T.L.O. decision is an example of the Terry standard
fairly stated but somewhat obscurely applied, the Court's more recent decision in O'Connor v. Ortega5 7 presents an extension of that
standard to the workplace context with its application to specific
facts held in abeyance."'

53

Id.

54

Id.

51 Id. at 345-47. For example, although all relevant evidence is generally admissible,
Fed. Rule Evid. 402, even "relevant" evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Fed. Rule Evid. 403. It is interesting to speculate whether the limited
probative value of urinalysis drug test results (see discussion in text, infra), even if sufficient
to make them "relevant" to workplace drug concerns, might nevertheless be "substantially
outweighed" by the risk that misperceptions regarding evidentiary value of such testing and
the stigma'that attaches to any use of illegal drugs are likely to produce "unfair prejudice"
and "confusion of the issues."
" The T.L.O. majority justified the school official's search primarily on the basis of
reasonable suspicion that cigarettes would be found in the purse, dismissing questions about
the way in which it was conducted as "hair-splitting argumentation." 469 U.S. at 345-47.
94 L. Ed.2d 714 (cited in note 4).
Id. at 728-29. Specifically, it held that "public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-
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In O'Connor, a plurality of the Court took the analytical
framework which the T.L.O. majority fashioned for determining
the reasonableness of searches by officials in schools, and announced its adoption as the standard for determining the reasonableness of workplace searches by public employers.
"Ordinarily," the plurality stated, "a search of an employee's
office ... will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the
search is necessary for a non-investigatory, work-related purpose
such as to retrieve a needed file." 0 As in T.L.O., "the search will
be permissible in its scope when 'the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of ... the nature of the [misconduct].' "61
Although the Court in O'Connor sought to discourage any anticipation of its views on workplace drug testing,62 its continuing
validation of the "dual inquiry" standard from Terry and its characterization of the public employer's interests in "work-related
searches" may provide some insight to its disposition toward that
issue.
"The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions
by public employers is the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace," the plurality stated; 63 even when employers conduct
an investigation of work-related employee misconduct, their interest is substantially different from that which the government has
in law enforcement.0 4 The plurality in O'Connor repeatedly con-

related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged
by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances." Id. at 728. Justice Scalia,
concurring in the judgment, would have gone further than the plurality to hold that "government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace
rules-searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context-do not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 732-33.
" Id. at 729.
60 Id.
" Id., citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (cited in note 4). Over a sharp dissent, a majority of
the Court declined to determine whether the specific search at issue satisfied this standard
of reasonableness, believing that a remand to the district court was necessary in order to
determine the specific justification for the search.
" Parenthetically, the plurality noted a number of other issues that it did not address,
including "the proper Fourth Amendment analysis for drug and alcohol testing of employees." Id. at 730-31 n.
6' Id. at 727.
6 "While police, and even administrative enforcement personnel, conduct searches for
the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for use in criminal or other enforcement proceedings, employers most frequently need to enter the offices and desks of their employees for
legitimate work-related reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct . . . Rather, work-related
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trasted the government's interests as employer and as law enforcer
primarily in support of its view that, as with the school searches in
T.L.O., there is no need to require that workplace searches be
predicated upon obtaining a warrant or otherwise demonstrating
probable cause. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the distinction is relevant to the "reasonableness" of urinalysis drug testing from the "probative value" perspective.
II.

A.

URINE DRUG TESTING AND PROBATIVE VALUE

Toxicological Analysis: What Do Results Prove?

In contrast to the oft-debated questions regarding the "accuracy" and "reliability" of the various methods of urinalysis drug
testing, the "probative value" of a properly confirmed "positive"
result from such testing has not been the subject of dispute within
the scientific and legal communities.
The consensus of opinion concerning the interpretive limits of
urinalysis drug testing, as reflected in the views of the published
scientific literature, was succinctly summarized in a statement of
the American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs as
part of the report on "Scientific Issues in Drug Testing" that was
adopted by the AMA's House of Delegates at its 1986 Interim
Meeting and reprinted in the June 12, 1987 issue of the Journal of
the American Medical Association:
Within the limits of accuracy of the tests that are used
and the administrative security of the program in which
these tests are carried out, drug testing only differentiates between persons who have exposed themselves to
the drugs being tested for and those who have not. The
results do not give any indication of the pattern of drug
use (method of administration, frequency of use, time of
last use, or amount used), of whether the individual
abuses or is dependent on a drug, or of whether an individual is impaired physically or mentally by the use of
the drug. 5
searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency." Id. at 726. "In contrast
to law enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal
law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the
work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner." Id. at 727.
'5 See Scientific Issues in Drug Testing, Report J of the Council on Scientific Affairs,
American Medical Association (December 1986), reprinted in 257 J. A.M.A. 3110, 3110-3114
(June 12, 1987). The statement by AMA's Council on Scientific Affairs was cited with approval in Congressional testimony presented on behalf of the College of American Patholo-
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As stated at the beginning of this article, the significance of
these limitations in determining the reasonableness of governmentmandated urinalysis drug testing in the workplace is derived from
a close examination of the asserted governmental objective in requiring such testing. Such an analysis has no meaning when the
government's interest is generalized into slogans about achieving a
"Drug-Free Federal Workplace." 6 "Reasonableness," in a practical
as well as constitutional sense, demands that the initiation and
scope of a particular search must be justified with some particularity of purpose, in order to provide a context in which the chosen
method of the search can be assessed for probative value.
B.

Probative Value and Drug Testing in School

Anable v. Ford,67 a student drug testing case which was decided after and in reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in New
Jersey v. T.L.O., provides a clear illustration of the results of the
"probative value" analysis in the context of an explicit statement
of the justifying government interest.
Anable concerned a high school student, Laura Balch, and two
friends who were all suspected of smoking marijuana in the school
restroom in violation of a school board policy prohibiting the sale,
distribution, use or possession of marijuana by students "in school
buildings, on school property, or at school functions."68 The policy
stated that a trace of illegal drugs in one's body" is a violation of
its proscriptions, and noted that students "may be required" to
submit to different tests, including urinalysis.6 9
Balch and her friends submitted to urinalysis several days after the restroom allegation was made. When she tested "positive"
for marijuana use, Balch admitted that she had smoked marijuana
at home during the interim period before the test, but continued to
deny that she had smoked it in the school restroom as alleged.°
gists to the Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials, House of Representatives 6 (June 16, 1987) (Statement of
Wayne R. Markus, MD) (unpublished). For similar conclusions, see also Employee Drug
Screening: Q & A on Detection of Drug Use by Urinalysis, National Institute on Drug
Abuse, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: DHHS Publication No. (ADM) 861442, 4, 10-11 (1986).
6 Executive Order No. 12564, Drug-Free Federal Workplace, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889
(1986).
17 653 F. Supp. 22 (cited in note 2).
"' Id. at 25.
69 Id.
71 Id. at 27.
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Nevertheless, to avoid the possibility of expulsion, Balch "withdrew" from school and gave up all of her credits for the semester.
Based on "negative" test results, however, her friends were "exonerated." At trial, the school superintendent admitted that Balch
would not have been expelled or asked to withdraw in the absence
of the "positive" test results.7
The district court looked to T.L.O. for its statement of the
general interest of teachers and administrators in "maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds" as part of preserving a "proper educational environment. 7' 2 "Nonetheless," the
court reasoned, "teachers and school officials are not law enforcement personnel and their task is to educate, not to ferret out crime
''
or other nefarious activity. 17
Since the clear purpose of the urinalysis testing had been to
determine whether Balch and her friends had used marijuana at
school, the court considered expert testimony from a Board Certified Toxicologist regarding the probative value of the test results
and, based upon the stated limitations, concluded that, since the
test "provides no information as to whether any given student has
used marijuana while at school, possessed marijuana at school, or
was under the influence of marijuana while at school," the school's
"use of the test to confirm or deny the version of events that plaintiff Balch conveyed to school officials was irrational, arbitrary and
capricious."' 74 In explicit reliance on T.L.O., the court rejected the
argument that the school officials may impose sanctions based
upon the test result notwithstanding its incapability of establishing
whether a student used or was under the influence of marijuana at
school. "[U]se of the test is not reasonably related to the maintenance of order and security in the schools nor to the preservation
7' 5
of the educational environment and processes.
The court made clear that, regardless of other more general
social benefits that might flow from the identification of drug
users, the school's need to identify them had to stand or fall on the
particulars of its own more specific institutional justifications.
"Certainly it would be beneficial to the vast majority of students
who do not use drugs or alcohol, even at home or on the streets, to
segregate users from the halls of education ... Nonetheless," the

Id. at 28.
Id. at 38. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338-39 (cited in note 4).
73 Anable, 653 F. Supp. at 38 (cited in note
2).
71 Id. at 39.
71

71

7* Id.

at 40.
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court reasoned, "such conduct is within the realm of parents and
law enforcement officials, not teachers and educational admin'7

istrators.

1

What is particularly noteworthy about the court's conclusions
in Anable is how directly they were drawn from its reading of the
Terry "dual inquiry" standard in the institutional context of
T.L.O.. 7 7 Yet, curiously, while it was not overruled and does not

even appear to have been appealed, Anable has not served as a
precedent to encourage other courts to utilize the "probative
value" analysis in the workplace drug testing context. This is not
to say, however, that this field lies completely fallow.
C. Probative Value and "Work-Related" Drug Use
In National Federation of Federal Employees v. Weinberger
(hereafter NFFE),78 the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the
dismissal of a suit to enjoin the Department of Defense from implementing a mandatory urinalysis drug testing program for certain of its civilian employees. The appellate panel, in an opinion by
Judge Harry Edwards, rejected the lower court's jurisdictional basis for throwing out the suit,7 9 and sent it back to the district court

'8 0
with "some guidance for the task to be tackled on remand.
The "guidance" provided by the appellate panel in NFFE was
largely drawn directly from the explications of Terry's "dual inquiry" standard of "reasonableness" in T.L.O. and O'Connor.81
There were, however, two significant refinements which steered the
court's analysis toward the question of the probative value of
urinalysis drug test results.
In explaining the first prong of the Terry "dual inquiry," i.e.,
"whether the search was justified at its inception," the NFFE
court placed its meaning as "whether 'reasonable grounds [exist]
for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence' of work-re-

lated drug use.

's2

Then, in the course of completing its citation to

T.L.O.'s characterization of the "scope" prong of the Terry in76

Id.

See, for example, id. at 40-43.
7" 818 F.2d 935 (cited in note 1).
7' The district court had ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction for plaintiffs'
federal questions because they involved a "labor-management dispute" which could only be
heard by the Federal Labor Relations Authority under the provisions of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978. See id. at 940.
" Id. at 942.
81 Id. at 942-43.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
77
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quiry, the court, in a final footnote, emphasized the importance of
clarity in distinguishing between the government's interests as employer and law enforcer where the reasonableness of warrantless
drug testing was at issue. "The government," stated the court,
"may not take advantage of any arguably relaxed 'employer' standard for warrantless searches to impose drug testing when its true
purpose is to obtain evidence of criminal activity without complying with the more stringent standards that normally protect citizens against unreasonable intrusive evidence-gathering." 3
Taken together, the two statements cited from the NFFE decision would seem to substantiate the following propositions: First,
that some drug use is "work-related" and some is not, requiring a
rejection of the assertion that "any and all" drug use is within the
scope of the government's legitimate concerns as an employer.
This, of course, raises questions about the precise nature of "workrelated" drug use and the reasonableness of a workplace drug testing procedure which cannot distinguish between "work-related"
and non-"work-related" drug use. Second, drug use is not made
"work-related" simply because the drugs in question are illegal to
use, sell, or possess. The "reasonableness" of government-mandated drug testing is not, therefore, derived from the illegality of
the drug use that it is designed to detect."'
More recently, in another D.C. Circuit panel decision written
by Judge Edwards, the Court in Jones v. McKenzie"5 explicitly rejected a particular method of urinalysis testing as lacking probative value in relation to the asserted government interest in requiring the tests. At the same time, it upheld the reasonableness of
testing without individualized suspicion when required in the context of a regular medical examination for employment purposes.
Id. at 943 n. 12 (cites omitted) (emphasis added).
84 The Fifth Circuit took a different view when it upheld testing of Customs Services

officers based not upon individualized reasonable suspicion but upon the individual's application for a promotion to certain specified positions. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178 (cited in
note 1) ("[An employee's use of the substances he has been hired to interdict casts substantial doubt upon his ability to carry out his duties honestly and vigorously, and undermines
public confidence in the integrity of the Service"). But see, for example, Caruso, 506
N.Y.S.2d 789 (cited in note 1) (distinguishing Von Raab in striking random testing of members of elite NYPD Organized Crime Control Bureau). Moreover, any asserted exception to
this proposition for law enforcement personnel directly involved in the interdiction of illegal
drug trafficking could not premise the reasonableness of testing all law enforcement officers
based on the illegal status of the drug use to be detected. See, for example, Feliciano, 661 F.
Supp. 578 (cited in note 1); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn 1986), aff'd No.
86-6280, slip op. (6th Cir., May 23, 1988); Capua, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (cited in note 1) (all
requiring individualized reasonable suspicion of drug use in order to justify testing).
85 833 F.2d 335 (cited in note 1).
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The case involved a school bus attendant whose job required
her to assist handicapped children on and off the school bus. Although not suspected of having ever used drugs, Juanita Jones was
required to submit to urinalysis as part of a physical examination
mandated by the D.C. Public School System. The notification that
she and other employees received explained that the purpose of
the urinalysis test was the enforcement of a School System directive prohibiting school personnel "to possess, use or be under the
influence of intoxicating liquors, narcotics, or other drugs such as
LSD, marijuana and the like, while on school premises."8 6
After testing "positive" for THC metabolites, an indicator of
marijuana use, Jones was dismissed and brought suit. The district
court held that termination on the basis of a single, unconfirmed
EMIT test was arbitrary and capricious, and that requiring the
test "in the absence of particularized probable cause" constituted
an unreasonable search. As he had in NFFE, Judge Edwards
based the panel's Fourth Amendment analysis squarely on the prescriptions of T.L.O. and O'Connor.8 In weighing the government's
interest, the court had "no doubt whatsoever that the School System's mission of safely transporting handicapped children to and
from school cannot be ensured if employees in the Transportation
Branch are allowed to work under the influence of illicit drugs."89
The court also found that this safety concern was prompted not
only by the nature of the jobs, but by strong evidence of "a veritable 'drug culture' among Transportation Branch employees."9
Having found that the testing was "justified at its inception,"
the court was similarly persuaded by two significant factors that
"the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of
the search and not excessively intrusive."9 1 The first factor was
that they involved "only testing that is conducted as part of a routine, reasonably required, annual medical examination," thus "ensuring that the intrusion on the employee's privacy is minimized."9 2 The second factor was that the government did not
contest that "any compulsory drug test employed by the School

" Id. at 337.
87

Id.

"e Id. at 338.
" Id. at 340.
90 Id.

91Id.
92

Id.

113]

PROBATIVE VALUE

System, in order to be lawful, must show a nexus to the employer's
safety concern."98
On the latter point, the court referred to the School System's
concession in the lower court that the EMIT Cannabinoid Urine
Assay, with which the plaintiff had been tested, is not a valid measure of whether the subject is in possession of, is using, or is under
the influence of illicit drugs at the time of the test, and therefore
"lacks a sufficient nexus" to the government's legitimate concern
that employees involved in the transportation of handicapped chil'
dren "not be under the influence of drugs while on duty."94
Because of the concession, the test administered to the plaintiff Jones was no longer in issue. "The only point left to be made in
this case," concluded the court, "is that any drug test the School
System employs in the future must be one that validly detects the
activity with which the School System is legitimately concerned."9 5
D.

Probative Value and Particularized Suspicion

In Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley,9 6 a divided
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck
down portions of Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations requiring post-accident and post-incident blood and urine
testing of railroad employees as "unreasonable" under the "dual
inquiry" analysis of Terry and the balancing in T.L.O. and
97
O'Connor.
As instructed by those decisions, the majority viewed the "justified at its inception" prong of the Terry inquiry as a function of
"whether there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up the evidence sought." For purposes of the FRA
testing requirement, the majority concluded that this meant there
must be reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will turn up
evidence that "the employee has violated the industry rule and
federal regulation ... prohibiting possession or use of alcohol and
controlled substances on the job and prohibiting working while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs."98
The majority noted that the Supreme Court had not determined in T.L.O. or O'Connor whether "reasonable grounds for suspecting" necessarily means that there must be individualized or

93 Id.

" Id. at 341.
95 Id.

91 839 F.2d 575 (cited in note 1).
11 Id. at 587-589. See 49 C.F.R. sec. 219.203(a) (1986).
98 Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587, referring to 49 C.F.R. sec. 219.101 (1986).

134

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1988:

particularized suspicion.9 Nevertheless, apparently influenced by
the fact that "these cases both involved searches of property, not
persons, and in both cases individualized suspicion did exist," the
majority held that "particularized suspicion is essential to finding
toxicological testing of railroad employees justified at its
inception."' 0 0
Its reasoning in this regard was straightforward: "Accidents,
incidents or rule violations, by themselves, do not create reasonable grounds for suspecting that tests will demonstrate alcohol or
drug impairment in any one railroad employee, much less an entire
train crew."'' 1 Yet, it still left two questions: Could the tests
demonstrate impairment if they are undertaken when there is individualized suspicion? If not, does the predicate of individualized
suspicion nevertheless make the testing reasonable?
Citing the decision of the D.C. Circuit panel in Jones v. McKenzie, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel concluded that
"urine tests intended to establish drug use other than alcohol are
not reasonably related to the stated purpose of the tests because
the tests cannot measure current drug impairment.' ' 1 2 "For this
reason," it added, somewhat paradoxically, "we think it imperative
that drug testing be undertaken only when there is individualized
suspicion because the combination of observable symptoms of impairment with a positive result on a drug test would provide a
sound basis for appropriate disciplinary action."'0 3
But would it? If one accepts the view of the majority in T.L.O.
and considers a method of search to be reasonable even though it
is only capable of producing "mere evidence," one might be willing
to infer what tests cannot prove, i.e., that the drug use evidenced
by the test is the cause of the "observable symptoms of
impairment."
Would such an inference be reasonable? The district court did
not think so in Anable v. Ford, and its reasoning considered both
the intrusiveness of the tests and their relevance to the ability of
officials to respond to suspected rule violations. In the district
Id. (cites omitted).
Id. The dissent would follow the Third Circuit's rationale in Shoemaker, applying
the "administrative search" exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of
the Fourth Amendment on the grounds that the railroad is a "closely regulated industry"
whose employees have a diminished expectation of privacy where the promotion of safety is
involved. See id. at 593.
101Id.
102 Id. at 588, citing Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d at 339 (cited in note 1).
100

103

Id.
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court's view, the search of students by urinalysis was not "reasonable under the circumstances, within the meaning of T.L.O.," because the "excessively intrusive nature of the search is not justified
by its 'need.' ,,104 Citing both Schmerber and T.L.O., it concluded
that "there must be a 'high probability' that the search would dis10 5
close evidence of a violation of school rules or the criminal laws."'
But if such a search would not, in fact, be conducted absent
recognizable symptoms of recent use by a student sufficient to justify dismissal (as was conceded by the principal and Superintendent of Schools in Anable) then such a test is unnecessary. "Put
another way, if there is a 'clear indication' that such evidence will
be found, the urine test is far too invasive in the school setting to
justify its need, because the overt manifestations of recent use,
plus a 'clear indication' that incriminating evidence will be found
in the urine, will be sufficient to justify the imposition of policy
sanctions without a test."'' 6
The rationale in Anable, regarding the irrelevance of drug
tests when school policy sanctions can be properly imposed on the
basis of "overt manifestations" of recent drug use, would clearly
apply with even greater force in the workplace. If, as is likely, an
employee's "overt manifestations" of recent drug use meet criteria
of unsatisfactory job performance or unacceptable workplace behavior independent of any attribution to drug use, the employer
would not be required to establish drug use or any other specific
cause in order to have a basis for taking appropriate disciplinary or
other adverse personnel actions. Indeed, even if urinalysis results
had substantial probative evidentiary use, they would neither be
necessary nor significantly supplemental for purposes of establishing or implementing the employer's interests in addressing unsatisfactory workplace performance or behavior by employees.
The majority in Burnley did not consider the questionable relevance of urinalysis tests where individualized suspicion was premised directly or indirectly on matters that would constitute unsatisfactory job performance or workplace behavior independent of
any link to drug use. But it did evidently believe that the added
factor of "observable symptoms of impairment" somehow permits
the "positive" result of a urinalysis drug test to be affirmatively
read as evidence of current intoxication, thus mitigating the lack of
probative evidentiary value in the test result standing alone, and
10, Anable,

105Id.
106Id.

653 F. Supp. at 41 (cited in note 2).
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transforming what would otherwise be an "unreasonable search"
into a "reasonable" one. However, this proposition is untenable because the ostensible justification for requiring the tests is based on
a supposition which is exactly the reverse: That the results of the
test will help to explain the "observable symptoms of impairment"
by confirming that they are the consequence of drug use detected
7
10
by the test.

Ultimately, the majority's opinion in Burnley remains a paradox. Its conclusion that "the combination of observable symptoms
of impairment with a positive result on a drug test would provide a
sound basis for appropriate disciplinary action"1 brushes aside
the lack of probative evidentiary value to permit urinalysis drug
testing based on individualized suspicion, while its conclusion that
"intrusive drug and alcohol testing may be required or authorized
only when specific articulable facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a test will reveal evidence of current drug or alcohol impairment"'1 9 would appear to disqualify all urinalysis testing for
lack of probative evidentiary value. Perhaps the inconsistency in
these statements reflects an ambivalence on the part of the majority regarding the weight and priority to be accorded to myriad considerations in applying traditional Fourth Amendment criteria to a
very untraditional method of search." 0 If so, the majority in Burnley reflects a pervasive uncertainty within the growing jurisprudence of workplace drug testing, and clearly illustrates the anxious
expectations that are now laid at the door of the Supreme Court.
107 The FRA regulations take a similar position, conceding that the urinalysis drug test
"cannot distinguish between recent use off the job and current impairment," but nevertheless providing that "a positive finding on the test will support a presumption that [the employee was] impaired at the time the sample was taken." 49 C.F.R. sec. 219.309(b)(2). Burnley, 839 F.2d at 597 (cited in note 1). Because the regulation permits the employee to "avoid
this presumption of impairment by demanding to provide a blood sample at the same time
the urine sample is collected," the dissent in Burnley believed that the regulation provides
"adequate safeguards to counter the problem of overbreadth" in the testing. Id. Whatever
may be true about the probative evidentiary capability of blood tests, this approach, like
that of the majority, merely props up the validity of the tests by shifting the ultimate evidentiary responsibility somewhere else. It cannot excuse the lack of probative evidentiary
value in the test results for the purpose of making their use "reasonable."
108 Id. at 589.

101Id. at 592.
10 Another example of inconsistent statements: "If individualized suspicion is included
in the preconditions for testing, we would conclude that the least intrusive means have been
selected to meet the legitimate governmental objectives of the tests . .. We are less convinced of the effectiveness of the tests in detecting drug impairment, but think the program
will serve reasonably well as a deterrence to on-the-job use of drugs and alcohol." Id. at 589.
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III. CONCLUSIONS

From this review, the author argues, the following conclusions
may be drawn:
1) Whether government-mandated urinalysis drug testing in
the workplace constitutes an "unreasonable search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment must be determined, in significant part, on an assessment of the probative evidentiary capacity
of such tests in relation to the government's workplace objective in
requiring them.
2) The importance of determining the relationship between
the probative value of the evidence which can be provided by a
particular type of search and the government interest which justifies the requirement of the search has been implicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court in assessing the reasonableness of
bodily-intrusive "search methods" based on analogously standardized scientific and technical procedures in Schmerber v. California
and Winston v. Lee. Moreover, the relationship between the probative value of the evidence which can be provided by a particular
method of search and the government interest which justifies its
requirement is logically intertwined with both prongs of the "dual
inquiry" standard adopted by the Court in Terry v. Ohio for determining the reasonableness of warrantless Fourth Amendment
searches based upon "reasonable suspicion." This standard, requiring courts to determine whether a search is both "justified at its
inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place," has become the
analytical framework for determining the reasonableness of a
Fourth Amendment search in noncriminal contexts through the
Supreme Court's decisions in New Jersey v. T.L.O., involving
searches of students at school, and O'Connor v. Ortega, addressing
the searches of employees in the workplace. The Court did not indicate whether "individualized suspicion" is an element of the
standard of reasonableness adopted in these decisions.
3) The governmental interest justifying workplace searches by
public employers, or by private employers under government mandate, is "the efficient and proper operation of the workplace." In
contrast to law enforcement officials, neither public employers nor
private employers acting under government direction are enforcers
of the criminal law, and therefore government-mandated searches
of employees must be for work-related reasons which are not dependent solely upon the illegality of the conduct at issue.
4) Therefore, in order for government-mandated workplace
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drug testing to be considered "justified at its inception," there
must be reasonable grounds for suspecting that this method of
search will turn up evidence of "work-related drug use."
5) "Work-related drug use" has not been authoritatively defined, but it arguably encompasses: (a) Drug use while on-duty or,
at least, on workplace premises; (b) drug use at any time or place
that causes the individual to be "under the influence of drugs"
while on-duty or on workplace premises; and, (c) drug use which
did not occur or cause the individual to be "under the influence of
drugs" while on-duty or on workplace premises, but which involves
illegal conduct that raises questions regarding the individual's ethical or moral fitness for particular employment.
6) Present methods of urinalysis drug testing only differentiate between persons who have exposed themselves to the drugs being tested and those who have not. The results do not give any
indication of the pattern of drug use (method of administration,
frequency of use, time of last use, or amount used), of whether the
individual abuses or is dependent on a drug, or of whether an individual is impaired physically or mentally by the use of the drug.
7) A confirmed "positive" urinalysis test lacks probative evidentiary value for determining whether the detected drug use occurred on or off-duty/workplace premises; similarly, it can offer no
probative evidence to determine whether an individual is or was, at
any determinate time or place, "under the influence" of the drug
detected. Therefore, the results of such testing cannot provide probative evidence for either of these concepts of "work-related drug
use," and the testing must be considered an "unreasonable
search."
8) A confirmed "positive" urinalysis test will provide probative
evidence for determining whether a particular individual has been
exposed to a particular illegal drug for purposes of assessing the
tested individual's ethical or moral fitness for employment as a
function of the individual's use of the illegal drug detected. However, this rationale for testing focuses solely on its probative value
in obtaining evidence of illegal conduct. It deals only with drug use
which cannot be proven to be "work-related" in any sense other
than its criminality. Given the clear distinction that must be
drawn between the government's interests as employer and law enforcer in justifying a Fourth Amendment search, it is unreasonable
to characterize drug use as "work-related" based solely on its illegality, for this would permit the government as law enforcer to
abuse the greater latitude that the Fourth Amendment gives to the
government as employer in order to obtain evidence of criminal
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activity by means which would not be permissible if it were clearly
acting in its capacity as law enforcer.
9) The presence of individualized suspicion does not enhance
the probative value of the results of urinalysis drug testing. The
predicate of "individualized suspicion" does not permit a "positive" test result to be affirmatively read as evidence of current intoxication, any more than the results of the test can validate "observable symptoms of impairment" by confirming that they are in
fact the consequence of drug use detected by the test.

